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The Ajax Coal Company is the only hirer of labor in its area. It can hire any number of female workers or male workers it wishes. The supply curve for women is given by \\[ l_{f}=100 w_{f} \\] and for men by \\[ l_{m}=9 w_{m}^{2} \\] where \(w_{f}\) and \(w_{m}\) are the hourly wage rates paid to female and male workers, respectively. Assume that Ajax sells its coal in a perfectly competitive market at \(\$ 5\) per ton and that each worker hired (both men and women) can mine 2 tons per hour. If the firm wishes to maximize profits, how many female and male workers should be hired, and what will the wage rates be for these two groups? How much will Ajax earn in profits per hour on its mine machinery? How will that result compare to one in which Ajax was constrained (say, by market forces) to pay all workers the same wage based on the value of their marginal products?

Short Answer

Expert verified
#Answer# The labor supply curve for female workers is l_f = 100w_f. To maximize profits, Ajax Coal Company should hire 1000 female workers.

Step by step solution

01

Express the labor supply curves for female and male workers

We are given the labor supply curves for female and male workers as follows: For female workers: \\[ l_{f} = 100w_{f} \\] For male workers: \\[ l_{m} = 9w_{m}^2 \\]
02

Find the value of the marginal product of labor

The coal price is \(\$5\) per ton, and each worker can mine 2 tons per hour, so the value of the marginal product of labor (VML) is: \\[ VML = 2 \times 5 = \$10 \\]
03

Calculate the optimal number of female and male workers hired

To maximize profits, the company needs to hire workers until the value of their marginal products equals their wage rates. So, this equality holds for both female and male workers: For female workers: \\[ VML = w_{f} \\] For male workers: \\[ VML = w_{m} \\] Using the given VML value, we get: \\[ w_{f} = 10 \\ w_{m} = 10 \\] Now, plug the wage rates into the labor supply equations: For female workers: \\[ l_{f} = 100w_{f} = 100(10) = 1000 \\] For male workers: \\[ l_{m} = 9w_{m}^2 = 9(10)^2 = 900 \\] So, the company should hire 1000 female workers and 900 male workers to maximize profits.
04

Calculate Ajax's profits per hour

Ajax's total hourly revenue is: \\[ Revenue = (\text{number of workers}) \times (\text{tons/hour/worker}) \times (\text{price/ton}) \\ = (1000 + 900) \times 2 \times 5 = 1900 \times 10 = 19000 \\] Ajax's total hourly wages for both groups are: \\[ Wages = (1000w_{f} + 900w_{m}) = 1000(10) + 900(10) = 19000 \\] Thus, Ajax's profits per hour on its mine machinery are: \\[ Profits = Revenue - Wages = 19000 - 19000 = \$0 \\]
05

Compare the results with the constrained wage scenario

If Ajax was constrained to pay equal wages based on the value of the workers' marginal product, the situation would be different. As the value of the marginal product of labor is \(\$10\), the wages would be equal for both genders, and the equilibrium in the labor market would happen faster than in the initial scenario. However, the profits would still be zero since the wages equal the value of the workers' marginal product. In both cases, Ajax Coal Company earns no profits per hour on mine machinery because all the revenues are paid to the workers as wages.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Carl the clothier owns a large garment factory on an isolated island. Carl's factory is the only source of employment for most of the islanders, and thus Carl acts as a monopsonist. The supply curve for garment workers is given by \\[ l=80 w \\] where \(l\) is the number of workers hired and \(w\) is their hourly wage. Assume also that Carl's labor demand (marginal revenue product \()\) curve is given by \\[ l=400-40 M R P_{1} \\] a. How many workers will Carl hire to maximize his profits, and what wage will he pay? b. Assume now that the government implements a minimum wage law covering all garment workers. How many workers will Carl now hire, and how much unemployment will there be if the minimum wage is set at \(\$ 4\) per hour? c. Graph your results. under perfect competition? (Assume the minimum wage is above the market- determined wage.)

As we saw in this chapter, the elements of labor supply theory can also be derived from an expenditure-minimization approach. Suppose a person's utility function for consumption and leisure takes the Cobb-Douglas form \(U(c, h)=c^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha} .\) Then the expenditure-minimization problem is \\[ \text { minimize } c-w(24-h) \text { s.t. } U(c, h)=c^{a} h^{1-\alpha}=\bar{U} \\]. a. Use this approach to derive the expenditure function for this problem. b. Use the envelope theorem to derive the compensated demand functions for consumption and leisure. c. Derive the compensated labor supply function. Show that \(\partial l^{c} / \partial w>0\) (with \(n=0\) ). Use the Slutsky equation to show why income and substitution effects of a change in the real wage are precisely offsetting in the uncompensated Cobb-Douglas labor supply function.

A welfare program for low-income people offers a family a basic grant of \(\$ 6,000\) per year. This grant is reduced by \(\$ 0.75\) for each \(\$ 1\) of other income the family has. a. How much in welfare benefits does the family receive if it has no other income? If the head of the family earns \(\$ 2,000\) per year? How about \(\$ 4,000\) per year? b. At what level of earnings does the welfare grant become zero? c. Assume the head of this family can earn \(\$ 4\) per hour and that the family has no other income. What is the annual budget constraint for this family if it does not participate in the welfare program? That is, how are consumption ( \(c\) ) and hours of leisure ( \(h\) ) related? What is the budget constraint if the family opts to participate in the welfare program? (Remember, the welfare grant can only be positive. e. Graph your results from parts (c) and (d). f. Suppose the government changes the rules of the welfare program to permit families to keep 50 percent of what they earn. How would this change your answers to parts (d) and (e)? g. Using your results from part (f), can you predict whether the head of this family will work more or less under the new rules described in part (f)?

Suppose there are 8,000 hours in a year (actually there are 8,760 ) and that an individual has a potential market wage of \(\$ 5\) per hour. a. What is the individual's full income? If he or she chooses to devote 75 percent of this income to leisure, how many hours will be worked? b. Suppose a rich uncle dies and leaves the individual an annual income of \(\$ 4,000\) per year. If he or she continues to devote 75 percent of full income to leisure, how many hours will be worked? c. How would your answer to part (b) change if the market wage were \(\$ 10\) per hour instead of \(\$ 5\) per hour? d. Graph the individual's supply of labor curve implied by parts (b) and (c).

uncertain. If we assume utility is additive across the two periods, we have \(E\left[U\left(c_{1}, h_{1}, c_{2}, h_{2}\right)\right]=U\left(c_{1}, h_{1}\right)+E\left[U\left(c_{2}, h_{2}\right)\right]\) Show that the first-order conditions for utility maximization in period 1 are the same as those shown in Chapter \(16 ;\) in particular, show \(M R S\left(c_{1} \text { for } h_{1}\right)=w_{1} .\) Explain how changes in \(W_{0}\) will affect the actual choices of \(c_{1}\) and \(h_{1}\) b. Explain why the indirect utility function for the second period can be written as \(V\left(w_{2}, W^{*}\right),\) where \(W^{*}=W_{0}+w_{1}\left(1-h_{1}\right)-\) \(c_{1}\). (Note that because \(w_{2}\) is a random variable, \(V\) is also random.) c. Use the envelope theorem to show that optimal choice of \(W^{*}\) requires that the Lagrange multipliers for the wealth constraint in the two periods obey the condition \(\lambda_{1}=E\left(\lambda_{2}\right)\) (where \(\lambda_{1}\) is the Lagrange multiplier for the original problem and \(\lambda_{2}\) is the implied Lagrange multiplier for the period 2 utility- maximization problem). That is, the expected marginal utility of wealth should be the same in the two periods. Explain this result intuitively. d. Although the comparative statics of this model will depend on the specific form of the utility function, discuss in general terms how a governmental policy that added \(k\) dollars to all period 2 wages might be expected to affect choices in both periods.

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