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An alternative way to study the welfare properties of a monopolist's choices is to assume the existence of a utility function for the customers of the monopoly of the form utility \(=U(Q, X),\) where \(Q\) is quantity consumed and \(X\) is the quality associated with that quantity. A social planner's problem then would be to choose \(Q\) and \(X\) to maximize social welfare as represented by \(S W=U(Q, X)-C(Q, X)\). a. What are the first-order conditions for a welfare maximum? b. The monopolist's goal is to choose the \(Q\) and \(X\) that maximize \(\pi=P(Q, X) \cdot Q-C(Q, X) .\) What are the first-order conditions for this maximization? c. Use your results from parts (a) and (b) to show that, at the monopolist's preferred choices, \(\partial S W / \partial Q>0\). That is, as we have already shown, prove that social welfare would be improved if more were produced. Hint: Assume that \(\partial U / \partial Q=P\) d. Show that, at the monopolist's preferred choices, the sign of \(\partial S W / \partial X\) is ambiguous-that is, it cannot be determined (on the sole basis of the general theory of monopoly) whether the monopolist produces either too much or too little quality.

Short Answer

Expert verified
In conclusion, the first-order conditions for a welfare maximum are: $$ \frac{\partial U}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial U}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} = 0. $$ The first-order conditions for the profit maximization are: $$ \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} = 0. $$ At the monopolist's preferred choices, it is shown that \(\partial SW/ \partial Q > 0\), which means that social welfare would increase if the monopolist produced more of the good. However, the sign of \(\partial SW / \partial X\) is ambiguous, as it depends on the change in price with respect to quality (X). Therefore, it is unclear whether social welfare would increase or decrease if the monopolist improved the quality of the good.

Step by step solution

01

Set up the social welfare function

Having utility function U(Q, X) and cost function C(Q, X), the social welfare (SW) function is given by: $$ SW = U(Q, X) - C(Q, X). $$
02

Finding the first-order conditions

In order to find the first-order conditions for a welfare maximum, we need to take the partial derivatives of SW with respect to Q and X, and equate them to zero. $$ \frac{\partial SW}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial SW}{\partial X} = 0, $$ which gives us the following equations: $$ \frac{\partial U}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial U}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} = 0. $$ #b. The monopolist's goal is to choose the \(Q\) and \(X\) that maximize \(\pi=P(Q,X) \cdot Q-C(Q, X) .\) What are the first-order conditions for this maximization?#
03

Set up the profit function

The monopolist's profit function is given by: $$ \pi = P(Q,X) \cdot Q - C(Q, X). $$
04

Finding the first-order conditions

In order to find the first-order conditions for the profit maximization, we need to take the partial derivatives of profit (π) with respect to Q and X, and equate them to zero: $$ \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial X} = 0, $$ which gives us the following equations: $$ \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} = 0. $$ #c. Use your results from parts (a) and (b) to show that, at the monopolist's preferred choices, \(\partial S W / \partial Q>0\).#
05

Substitute the hint

Use the hint to replace \(\partial U / \partial Q\) in the first welfare condition with \(P\): $$ P - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0. $$
06

Compare the conditions

Compare the first-order conditions for profit maximization and welfare maximization with respect to Q. In this case, we have: $$ \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0, $$ which means, $$ (\frac{\partial P}{\partial Q} \cdot Q + P) - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q} = 0, $$ or, $$ \frac{\partial P}{\partial Q} \cdot Q + (P - \frac{\partial C}{\partial Q}) = 0. $$ Since the quantity consumed is positive (\(Q>0\)) and the price-demand curve is downward sloping (\(\partial P / \partial Q < 0\)), we get, $$ \frac{\partial SW}{\partial Q} = \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial Q} - \frac{\partial P}{\partial Q} \cdot Q > 0 $$ #d. Show that, at the monopolist's preferred choices, the sign of \(\partial S W / \partial X\) is ambiguous.#
07

Compare the conditions

Compare the first-order conditions for profit maximization and welfare maximization with respect to X. We have: $$ \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial C}{\partial X}. $$
08

Analyze the sign of \(\partial S W / \partial X\)

The sign of \(\partial SW / \partial X\) is the same as the sign of: $$ \frac{\partial (P \cdot Q)}{\partial X} - \frac{\partial U}{\partial X}. $$ Since the change in price with respect to quality (X) is unknown, it is not possible to determine whether the sign of this expression is positive or negative. Therefore, the sign of \(\partial SW / \partial X\) is ambiguous.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

First-Order Conditions
The first-order conditions are critical to finding an optimum point—either a maximum or a minimum—of a function, especially when we are dealing with economics and optimization problems. These conditions are based upon setting the partial derivatives of the function to zero. In the context of welfare maximization, the social welfare function will have first-order conditions derived by equating its partial derivatives with respect to quantity (\(Q\) and quality (\(X\) to zero. This results in a system of equations that help determine the optimal levels of output and quality that maximize social welfare.

For the monopolist profit maximization, a similar approach is adopted. The first-order conditions involve differentiating the monopolist's profit function with respect to quantity and quality and setting these partial derivatives equal to zero. These resulting equations help the monopolist determine the profit-maximizing levels of output and quality. In simpler terms, the first-order conditions are like solving a puzzle by finding the right levels of output and quality that 'fit' the objective of maximizing either welfare or profit.
Social Welfare Function
A social welfare function is a mathematical representation used to aggregate individual utilities into a measure of societal well-being. In our exercise, it relates to how changes in quantity (\(Q\) and quality (\(X\) of a good affect the happiness of consumers and the overall social welfare. The function is typically written as the total utility derived from consumption minus the cost of providing the goods, representing the net social benefit. Understandably, a social planner would want to maximize this social welfare function to achieve the best possible outcome for society.

When we think about the goal of social welfare maximization, it's like aiming for the best possible scenario where the needs and happiness of all consumers are balanced with the cost of production. This is a delicate balancing act that seeks to provide the optimal amount of goods and services, not just for the benefit of individual consumers, but for society as a whole.
Monopolist Profit Maximization
The goal of a monopolist is quite different from that of a social planner. When we discuss monopolist profit maximization, we're focusing on the strategies used by a monopoly to choose the quantity (\(Q\) and quality (\(X\) of a product in such a way that their profit is maximized. This involves setting a price for their product that reflects both the market's demand and the costs incurred in production.

It's important for students to appreciate that a monopolist operates under different incentives compared to competitive firms. Since a monopolist faces no competition, they can manipulate prices and production levels to their advantage. This can lead to scenarios where the quantity produced is less, and the price is higher than what would be observed in a competitive market, hence reducing the overall social welfare, which is demonstrated in our exercise.
Partial Derivatives
To dig deeper into the math, partial derivatives play a pivotal role in understanding how a function changes as each of its variables is altered independently. In our context, they are used to determine the change in social welfare and the monopolist’s profit as the quantity (\(Q\) and quality (\(X\) of the good change.

Conceptually, consider a partial derivative as a magnifying glass that focuses on the impact of changing one specific factor while holding others constant. For students grappling with calculus, picturing these partial derivatives can be likened to observing just one ingredient in a recipe—seeing how changing that one ingredient alters the taste of the dish, without changing anything else. It's this granular approach that allows economists and planners to dissect the complex relationship between various economic factors and outcomes.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose a monopoly market has a demand function in which quantity demanded depends not only on market price (P) but also on the amount of advertising the firm does ( \(A\), measured in dollars). The specific form of this function is \\[Q=(20-P)\left(1+0.1 A-0.01 A^{2}\right).\\] The monopolistic firm's cost function is given by \\[C=10 Q+15+A.\\] a. Suppose there is no advertising \((A=0) .\) What output will the profit- maximizing firm choose? What market price will this yield? What will be the monopoly's profits? b. Now let the firm also choose its optimal level of advertising expenditure. In this situation, what output level will be chosen? What price will this yield? What will the level of advertising be? What are the firm's profits in this case? Hint: This can be worked out most easily by assuming the monopoly chooses the profit-maximizing price rather than quantity.

Suppose a monopolist produces alkaline batteries that may have various useful lifetimes \((X) .\) Suppose also that consumers (inverse) demand depends on batteries' lifetimes and quantity (Q) purchased according to the function \\[P(Q, X)=g(X \cdot Q),\\] where \(g^{\prime} < 0 .\) That is, consumers care only about the product of quantity times lifetime: They are willing to pay equally for many short-lived batteries or few long-lived ones. Assume also that battery costs are given by \\[C(Q, X)=C(X) Q,\\] where \(C^{\prime}(X) > 0 .\) Show that, in this case, the monopoly will opt for the same level of \(X\) as does a competitive industry even though levels of output and prices may differ. Explain your result. Hint: Treat \(X Q\) as a composite commodity.

Suppose the market for Hula Hoops is monopolized by a single firm. a. Draw the initial equilibrium for such a market. b. Now suppose the demand for Hula Hoops shifts outward slightly. Show that, in general (contrary to the competitive case), it will not be possible to predict the effect of this shift in demand on the market price of Hula Hoops. c. Consider three possible ways in which the price elasticity of demand might change as the demand curve shifts: It might increase, it might decrease, or it might stay the same. Consider also that marginal costs for the monopolist might be increasing, decreasing, or constant in the range where \(M R=M C\). Consequently, there are nine different combinations of types of demand shifts and marginal cost slope configurations. Analyze each of these to determine for which it is possible to make a definite prediction about the effect of the shift in demand on the price of Hula Hoops.

Suppose the government wishes to combat the undesirable allocational effects of a monopoly through the use of a subsidy. a. Why would a lump-sum subsidy not achieve the government's goal? b. Use a graphical proof to show how a per-unit-of-output subsidy might achieve the government's goal. c. Suppose the government wants its subsidy to maximize the difference between the total value of the good to consumers and the good's total cost. Show that, to achieve this goal, the government should set \\[\frac{t}{P}=-\frac{1}{e_{Q, P}},\\] where \(t\) is the per-unit subsidy and \(P\) is the competitive price. Explain your result intuitively.

Suppose a perfectly competitive industry can produce widgets at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 10\) per unit. Monopolized marginal costs increase to \(\$ 12\) per unit because \(\$ 2\) per unit must be paid to lobbyists to retain the widget producers' favored position. Suppose the market demand for widgets is given by \\[Q_{D}=1,000-50 P.\\] a. Calculate the perfectly competitive and monopoly outputs and prices. b. Calculate the total loss of consumer surplus from monopolization of widget production. c. Graph your results and explain how they differ from the usual analysis.

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