Chapter 11: Problem 6
Would a lump-sum profits tax affect the profit-maximizing quantity of output? How about a proportional tax on profits? How about a tax assessed on each unit of output? How about a tax on labor input?
Chapter 11: Problem 6
Would a lump-sum profits tax affect the profit-maximizing quantity of output? How about a proportional tax on profits? How about a tax assessed on each unit of output? How about a tax on labor input?
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Get started for freeWith a CES production function of the form \(q=\left(k^{\rho}+l^{\rho}\right)^{\gamma / \rho}\) a whole lot of algebra is needed to compute the profit function as \(\Pi(P, v, w)=K P^{1 /(1-\gamma)}\left(v^{1-\alpha}+w^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\gamma /(1-\sigma)(\gamma-1)},\) where \(\sigma=1 /(1-\rho)\) and \(K\) is a constant a. If you are a glutton for punishment (or if your instructor is), prove that the profit function takes this form. Perhaps the easiest way to do so is to start from the CES cost function in Example 10.2 b. Explain why this profit function provides a reasonable representation of a firm's behavior only for \(0<\gamma<1\) c. Explain the role of the elasticity of substitution ( \(\sigma\) ) in this profit function. What is the supply function in this case? How does \(\sigma\) determine the extent to which that function shifts when input prices change? e. Derive the input demand functions in this case. How are these functions affected by the size of \(\sigma ?\)
This problem has you work through some of the calculations associated with the numerical example in the Extensions. Refer to the Extensions for a discussion of the theory in the case of Fisher Body and General Motors (GM), who we imagine are deciding between remaining as separate firms or having GM acquire Fisher Body and thus become one (larger) firm. Let the total surplus that the units generate together be \(S\left(x_{F}, x_{G}\right)=x_{F}^{1 / 2}+a x_{G}^{1 / 2},\) where \(x_{F}\) and \(x_{G}\) are the investments undertaken by the managers of the two units before negotiating, and where a unit of investment costs \(\$ 1 .\) The parameter \(a\) measures the importance of GM's manager's investment. Show that, according to the property rights model worked out in the Extensions, it is efficient for GM to acquire Fisher Body if and only if GM's manager's investment is important enough, in particular, if \(a>\sqrt{3}\)
The demand for any input depends ultimately on the demand for the goods that input produces. This can be shown most explicitly by deriving an entire industry's demand for inputs. To do so, we assume that an industry produces a homogencous good, \(Q,\) under constant returns to scale using only capital and labor. The demand function for \(Q\) is given by \(Q=D(P)\), where \(P\) is the market price of the good being produced. Because of the constant returns-to- scale assumption, \(P=M C=A C\). Throughout this problem let \(C(v, w, 1)\) be the firm's unit cost function. a. Explain why the total industry demands for capital and labor are given by \(K=Q C_{v}\) and \(L=Q C_{w}\) b. Show that \\[ \frac{\partial K}{\partial v}=Q C_{v v}+D^{\prime} C_{v}^{2} \quad \text { and } \quad \frac{\partial L}{\partial w}=Q C_{w w}+D^{\prime} C_{w}^{2} \\] c. Prove that \\[ C_{w v}=\frac{-w}{v} C_{v w} \quad \text { and } \quad C_{w w}=\frac{-v}{w} C_{N w} \\] d. Use the results from parts (b) and (c) together with the elasticity of substitution defined as \(\sigma=C C_{v n} / C_{\nu} C_{w}\) to show that \\[ \frac{\partial K}{\partial v}=\frac{w L}{Q} \cdot \frac{\sigma K}{v C}+\frac{D^{\prime} K^{2}}{Q^{2}} \text { and } \frac{\partial L}{\partial w}=\frac{v K}{Q} \cdot \frac{\sigma L}{w C}+\frac{D^{\prime} L^{2}}{Q^{2}} \\] e. Convert the derivatives in part (d) into elasticities to show that \\[ e_{K, v}=-s_{L} \sigma+s_{K} e_{Q, p} \quad \text { and } \quad e_{L, w}=-s_{K} \sigma+s_{L} e_{Q, P} \\] where \(e_{Q, P}\) is the price elasticity of demand for the product being produced. f. Discuss the importance of the results in part (e) using the notions of substitution and output effects from Chapter 11 Note: The notion that the elasticity of the derived demand for an input depends on the price elasticity of demand for the output being produced was first suggested by Alfred Marshall. The proof given here follows that in D. Hamermesh, Labor Demand (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
How would you expect an increase in output price, \(P\), to affect the demand for capital and labor inputs? a. Explain graphically why, if neither input is inferior, it seems clear that a rise in \(P\) must not reduce the demand for either factor. b. Show that the graphical presumption from part (a) is demonstrated by the input demand functions that can be derived in the Cobb-Douglas case. c. Use the profit function to show how the presence of inferior inputs would lead to ambiguity in the effect of \(P\) on input demand.
This problem concerns the relationship between demand and marginal revenue curves for a few functional forms. a. Show that, for a linear demand curve, the marginal revenue curve bisects the distance between the vertical axis and the demand curve for any price. b. Show that, for any linear demand curve, the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves is \(-1 / b \cdot q\) where \(b(<0)\) is the slope of the demand curve. c. Show that, for a constant elasticity demand curve of the form \(q=a P^{b}\), the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves is a constant ratio of the height of the demand curve, with this constant depending on the price elasticity of demand. d. Show that, for any downward-sloping demand curve, the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves at any point can be found by using a linear approximation to the demand curve at that point and applying the procedure described in part (b). e. Graph the results of parts (a)-(d) of this problem.
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