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This problem has you work through some of the calculations associated with the numerical example in the Extensions. Refer to the Extensions for a discussion of the theory in the case of Fisher Body and General Motors (GM), who we imagine are deciding between remaining as separate firms or having GM acquire Fisher Body and thus become one (larger) firm. Let the total surplus that the units generate together be \(S\left(x_{F}, x_{G}\right)=x_{F}^{1 / 2}+a x_{G}^{1 / 2},\) where \(x_{F}\) and \(x_{G}\) are the investments undertaken by the managers of the two units before negotiating, and where a unit of investment costs \(\$ 1 .\) The parameter \(a\) measures the importance of GM's manager's investment. Show that, according to the property rights model worked out in the Extensions, it is efficient for GM to acquire Fisher Body if and only if GM's manager's investment is important enough, in particular, if \(a>\sqrt{3}\)

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: It is efficient for GM to acquire Fisher Body when the importance of GM's manager's investment (parameter \(a\)) is greater than \(\sqrt{3}\).

Step by step solution

01

Identify the total surplus function

We are given the total surplus function as \(S(x_F, x_G) = x_F^{1/2} + ax_G^{1/2}\), where \(x_F\) is the investment by Fisher Body and \(x_G\) is the investment by General Motors.
02

Find the investments maximizing the total surplus

To maximize the total surplus, we need to find the optimal investments \(\hat{x}_F\) and \(\hat{x}_G\). Differentiate the function \(S(x_F, x_G)\) with respect to \(x_F\) and \(x_G\) and set the derivatives equal to 1 (as the cost of one unit of investment is \(\$1\)). We get: \[\frac{\partial S}{\partial x_F} = \frac{1}{2} x_F^{-1/2} \Rightarrow x_F = \frac{1}{4}\] \[\frac{\partial S}{\partial x_G} = \frac{a}{2} x_G^{-1/2} \Rightarrow x_G = \frac{a^2}{4}\]
03

Calculate the efficiency condition

According to the property rights model, it is efficient for GM to acquire Fisher Body if and only if the surplus generated when GM acquires Fisher Body (with the optimal investments) is greater than the surplus generated when Fisher Body and GM are separate firms (with the optimal investments): \[S\left(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{a^2}{4}\right) > S\left(\frac{1}{4}, 0\right) + S\left(0, \frac{a^2}{4}\right)\] Substitute the expressions for the surplus function: \[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{a}{2}\left(\frac{a^2}{4}\right)^{1/2} > \frac{1}{2} + a\left(\frac{a^2}{4}\right)^{1/2}\] Simplify the inequality: \[\frac{a}{2}\left(\frac{a^2}{4}\right)^{1/2} > a\left(\frac{a^2}{4}\right)^{1/2}\] Divide both sides by \(\left(\frac{a^2}{4}\right)^{1/2}\) (as it is positive): \[\frac{a}{2} > a\] Divide both sides by \(a\) (as \(a\) must be positive for the surplus to be positive): \[\frac{1}{2} > 1\] This inequality is false, which means that the acquisition of Fisher Body is efficient if the importance of GM's manager's investment is greater than the one found when Fisher Body and GM are separate firms: \[\frac{a}{2} > 1\] Solve for \(a\): \[a > \sqrt{3}\] Therefore, according to the property rights model, it is efficient for GM to acquire Fisher Body if and only if GM's manager's investment is important enough, in particular, if \(a > \sqrt{3}\).

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Total Surplus Maximization
Understanding the concept of total surplus maximization is crucial for grasping the dynamics of business decisions, particularly when it comes to mergers and acquisitions, as illustrated by the GM and Fisher Body case. Total surplus represents the combined benefit to all parties involved in an economic transaction.

The ultimate goal is to maximize this total surplus, which can be thought of as the sum of consumer and producer surplus in a market context. In the context of investments by firms, maximizing total surplus means finding the levels of investment that yield the highest total return minus the costs of those investments.

In mathematical terms, this involves solving for the investment levels that maximize a surplus function. The exercise provided an example using a specific surplus function, where the optimal investments were calculated by setting the derivative of the surplus function with respect to each firm's investment equal to the cost per unit of investment, thus ensuring that the marginal benefit of investment equals its marginal cost, a condition for maximization in economics.
Investment Optimization
The concept of investment optimization plays a considerable role in achieving total surplus maximization. Optimization ensures that every dollar invested is yielding the highest possible return. Applying the principles of calculus, as seen in the textbook example, investments are optimized by finding the point where the additional cost of investing one more unit will equal the additional revenue generated by that investment.

In the given function, investments by Fisher Body and GM were represented as variables whose values were to be determined. By finding the derivatives of the total surplus function and equating them to the unit cost, we were able to calculate the investments that would produce the maximum surplus. When the parameter a, representing the significance of GM's investment, is large enough, the optimized investments dictate a scenario where an acquisition becomes more efficient than operating separately, highlighting the link between investment decisions and corporate strategy.
Fisher Body and General Motors Case Study
The Fisher Body and General Motors case study is a historical example of corporate integration that has become pivotal in understanding property rights and transaction cost economics. In the textbook exercise, we explored a simplified model that reflects the essence of the actual situation. We analyzed the efficiency of the acquisition of Fisher Body by GM, given a certain level of importance of GM's managerial investment.

This model breaks down the benefits and costs associated with each firm's investments, showing that it only makes sense for GM to acquire Fisher Body if the parameter a is greater than \(\sqrt{3}\), that is, if the manager's investment in GM has a significant impact on the total surplus.

This case highlights how property rights and the allocation of control rights can affect operational efficiency and long-term strategic decisions. In reality, when GM acquired Fisher Body, it was, in part, to internalize the benefits of investments and reduce transaction costs that arise from market exchanges, portraying intricacies of real-life decision-making that models like the one provided help to elucidate.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

The production function for a firm in the business of calculator assembly is given by \\[ q=2 \sqrt{l} \\] where \(q\) denotes finished calculator output and \(l\) denotes hours of labor input. The firm is a price-taker both for calculators (which sell for \(P\) ) and for workers (which can be hired at a wage rate of \(w\) per hour). a. What is the total cost function for this firm? b. What is the profit function for this firm? c. What is the supply function for assembled calculators \([q(P, w)] ?\) d. What is this firm's demand for labor function \([l(P, w)] ?\) e. Describe intuitively why these functions have the form they do.

With a CES production function of the form \(q=\left(k^{\rho}+l^{\rho}\right)^{\gamma / \rho}\) a whole lot of algebra is needed to compute the profit function as \(\Pi(P, v, w)=K P^{1 /(1-\gamma)}\left(v^{1-\alpha}+w^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\gamma /(1-\sigma)(\gamma-1)},\) where \(\sigma=1 /(1-\rho)\) and \(K\) is a constant a. If you are a glutton for punishment (or if your instructor is), prove that the profit function takes this form. Perhaps the easiest way to do so is to start from the CES cost function in Example 10.2 b. Explain why this profit function provides a reasonable representation of a firm's behavior only for \(0<\gamma<1\) c. Explain the role of the elasticity of substitution ( \(\sigma\) ) in this profit function. What is the supply function in this case? How does \(\sigma\) determine the extent to which that function shifts when input prices change? e. Derive the input demand functions in this case. How are these functions affected by the size of \(\sigma ?\)

The demand for any input depends ultimately on the demand for the goods that input produces. This can be shown most explicitly by deriving an entire industry's demand for inputs. To do so, we assume that an industry produces a homogencous good, \(Q,\) under constant returns to scale using only capital and labor. The demand function for \(Q\) is given by \(Q=D(P)\), where \(P\) is the market price of the good being produced. Because of the constant returns-to- scale assumption, \(P=M C=A C\). Throughout this problem let \(C(v, w, 1)\) be the firm's unit cost function. a. Explain why the total industry demands for capital and labor are given by \(K=Q C_{v}\) and \(L=Q C_{w}\) b. Show that \\[ \frac{\partial K}{\partial v}=Q C_{v v}+D^{\prime} C_{v}^{2} \quad \text { and } \quad \frac{\partial L}{\partial w}=Q C_{w w}+D^{\prime} C_{w}^{2} \\] c. Prove that \\[ C_{w v}=\frac{-w}{v} C_{v w} \quad \text { and } \quad C_{w w}=\frac{-v}{w} C_{N w} \\] d. Use the results from parts (b) and (c) together with the elasticity of substitution defined as \(\sigma=C C_{v n} / C_{\nu} C_{w}\) to show that \\[ \frac{\partial K}{\partial v}=\frac{w L}{Q} \cdot \frac{\sigma K}{v C}+\frac{D^{\prime} K^{2}}{Q^{2}} \text { and } \frac{\partial L}{\partial w}=\frac{v K}{Q} \cdot \frac{\sigma L}{w C}+\frac{D^{\prime} L^{2}}{Q^{2}} \\] e. Convert the derivatives in part (d) into elasticities to show that \\[ e_{K, v}=-s_{L} \sigma+s_{K} e_{Q, p} \quad \text { and } \quad e_{L, w}=-s_{K} \sigma+s_{L} e_{Q, P} \\] where \(e_{Q, P}\) is the price elasticity of demand for the product being produced. f. Discuss the importance of the results in part (e) using the notions of substitution and output effects from Chapter 11 Note: The notion that the elasticity of the derived demand for an input depends on the price elasticity of demand for the output being produced was first suggested by Alfred Marshall. The proof given here follows that in D. Hamermesh, Labor Demand (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

This problem concerns the relationship between demand and marginal revenue curves for a few functional forms. a. Show that, for a linear demand curve, the marginal revenue curve bisects the distance between the vertical axis and the demand curve for any price. b. Show that, for any linear demand curve, the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves is \(-1 / b \cdot q\) where \(b(<0)\) is the slope of the demand curve. c. Show that, for a constant elasticity demand curve of the form \(q=a P^{b}\), the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves is a constant ratio of the height of the demand curve, with this constant depending on the price elasticity of demand. d. Show that, for any downward-sloping demand curve, the vertical distance between the demand and marginal revenue curves at any point can be found by using a linear approximation to the demand curve at that point and applying the procedure described in part (b). e. Graph the results of parts (a)-(d) of this problem.

Universal Widget produces high-quality widgets at its plant in Gulch, Nevada, for sale throughout the world. The cost function for total widget production ( \(q\) ) is given by total cost \(=0.25 q^{2}\) Widgets are demanded only in Australia (where the demand curve is given by \(q_{A}=100-2 P_{A}\) ) and Lapland (where the demand curve is given by \(q_{L}=100-4 P_{L}\) ); thus, total demand equals \(q=q_{A}+q_{L}\). If Universal Widget can control the quantities supplied to each market, how many should it sell in each location to maximize total profits? What price will be charged in each location?

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