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Explain: “Politicians would make more rational economic decisions if they weren’t running for re-election every few years.”

Short Answer

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If politicians weren’t running for re-election every few years, there would be no purpose to accommodate practices like rent-seeking, special-interest effect, incorrect regulation of resources, etc. Therefore, the politicians will make more rational economic decisions.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for rational economic decision making by politicians when no re-election happens

Self-interest often influences the decision-making of politicians. They make decisions that fulfill their desired goals. Their main goal is to be reelected so they can make more money. Therefore, politicians adopt practices like rent-seeking, inefficient management of resources, incorrect regulation of markets, and corruption.

The small groups with shared interests try to either bribe or appeal to the politicians to support their advantage in exchange for help in elections. In the process, the economic efficiency suffers many times. Since the elections happen every few years, the politicians have set targets. To fulfill those targets, politicians make irrational economic decisions.

02

Example explaining how no re-elections affect the decision making of politicians

The following example will help understand what effects a no re-election will have on politicians’ decision-making.

A group of private railway companies operating in the US comes to the government to appeal for some favor. They ask the government to reduce the tax rate unreasonably in large amounts for fuel purchases. The politicians will agree with the companies if they provide them with the necessary support for the upcoming elections.

In this practice, the fuel price will decrease, and the government will fall short of the budget. The irrational economic decision by the politicians will result in a loss of economic efficiency.

However, if there were no re-elections, the politicians would have no self-interest in reducing the taxes. Therefore, the politicians will not reduce the taxes unreasonably and will make more economically rational decisions.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Use your demand schedule for the public good, determined in problem 1, and the following supply schedule to ascertain the optimal quantity of this public good.

Price (\()
Qd
191
162
133
104
75
46
27
18
Price (\))Qs
1910
168
136
104
72
41
2-
1-

Tammy Hall is the mayor of a large US city. She has just established the Office of Window Safety. Because windows sometimes break and spray glass shards, every window in the city will now have to pass an annual safety inspection. Property owners must pay the $5-per-window inspection cost—and by the way, Tammy has made her nephew the new head of the Office of Window Safety. This new policy is an example of _______.

a. political corruption

b. earmarks

c. rent-seeking

d. adverse selection

Jean-Baptiste Colbert was the Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV of France. He famously observed, "The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing." How does his comment relate to the special-interest effect?

Consider a corrupt provincial government in which each housing inspector examines two newly built structures each week. All the builders in the province are unethical and want to increase their profits by using substandard construction materials, but they can’t do that unless they can bribe a housing inspector into approving a substandard building.

a. If bribes cost \(1,000 each, how much will a housing inspector make each year in bribes? (Assume that each inspector works 52 weeks a year and gets bribed for every house he or she inspects.)

b. There is a provincial construction supervisor who gets to hire all of the housing inspectors. He himself is corrupt and expects his housing inspectors to share their bribes with him. Suppose that 20 inspectors work for him and that each passes along half the bribes collected from builders. How much will the construction supervisor collect each year?

c. Corrupt officials may have an incentive to reduce the provision of government services to help line their own pockets. Suppose that the provincial construction supervisor decides to cut the total number of housing inspectors from 20 to 10 in order to decrease the supply of new housing permits. This decrease in the supply of permits raises the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to \(2,500. How much per year will the construction supervisor now receive if he is still getting half of all the bribes collected by the 10 inspectors? How much more is the construction supervisor getting now than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? Will he personally be happy with the reduction in government services?

d. What would happen if reducing the number of inspectors from 20 to 10 only increased the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to $1,500? In this case, how much per year would the construction supervisor collect from his 10 inspectors? How much less is the construction supervisor getting than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? In this case, will the construction supervisor be happy with the reduction in government services? Will he want to go back to using 20 inspectors?

We can apply voting paradoxes to the highway construction example of Table 5.2. Suppose there are only five people in a society, and each favors one of the five highway construction options listed in Table 5.2 (“No new construction” is one of the five options). Explain which of these highway options will be selected using a majority paired-choice vote. Will this option be the optimal size of the project from an economic perspective?

Plan
Total cost of project (\()
Marginal cost (\))
Total Benefit
Marginal Benefit
Net Benefit (TB-TC)
No new construction
0-0--
A: Widen existing highways
5050200200150
B: New 2-lane highways
14090350150210
C: New 4-lane highways
240100470120230
D: New 6-lane highways
620380580110-40
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