Chapter 5: Q4. (page 114)
True or False: The median-voter model explains why politicians so often stake out fringe positions that appeal only to a small segment of the electorate.
Short Answer
The statement is true.
Chapter 5: Q4. (page 114)
True or False: The median-voter model explains why politicians so often stake out fringe positions that appeal only to a small segment of the electorate.
The statement is true.
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Get started for freeLook back at Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, which show the costs and benefits to voters Garcia, Johnson, and Lee of two different public goods that the government will produce if a majority of voters support them. Suppose that Garcia, Johnson, and Lee have decided to have one single vote at which the funding for both of those public goods will be decided simultaneously.
a. Given the $300 cost per person of each public good, what are Garciaโs net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will she vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?
b. What are Leeโs net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will she vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneously?
c. What are Johnsonโs net benefits for each public good individually and for the two combined? Will he vote yes or no on the proposal to fund both projects simultaneouslyโor will he be indifferent?
d. Who is the median voter here? Whom will the two other voters be attempting to persuade?
Use your demand schedule for the public good, determined in problem 1, and the following supply schedule to ascertain the optimal quantity of this public good.
Price (\() | |
19 | 1 |
16 | 2 |
13 | 3 |
10 | 4 |
7 | 5 |
4 | 6 |
2 | 7 |
1 | 8 |
Price (\)) | Qs |
19 | 10 |
16 | 8 |
13 | 6 |
10 | 4 |
7 | 2 |
4 | 1 |
2 | - |
1 | - |
On the basis of the three individual demand schedules in the following table, and assuming these are the only three people in the society, determine (a) the market demand schedule on the assumption that the good is a private good and (b) the collective demand schedule on the assumption that the good is a public good.
P($) | |||
8 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
7 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
6 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
5 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
4 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
3 | 3 | 6 | 4 |
2 | 4 | 7 | 5 |
1 | 5 | 8 | 6 |
โMajority voting ensures that government will produce only those public goods for which benefits exceed costs.โ Discuss.
How does the problem of limited and bundled choice in the public sector relate to economic efficiency? Why are public bureaucracies possibly less efficient than business firms?
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