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9. Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions.

Suppose this is a one-shot game:

a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not.

b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not.

c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not

Short Answer

Expert verified

a. Player 1's dominant strategy is option A and Player 2's dominant strategy is option C.

b. The secure strategy for player 1 will be option A while for player 2 it will be option C.

c. The Nash equilibrium is strategy A, C (-10,-10).

Step by step solution

01

Finding the dominant strategy

a.

Here, both players only have one opportunity to choose their option, in which each player will seek to make the decision that will generate the highest possible payoff, thus generating their dominant strategy.

With respect to the dominant strategy of player 1, if player 2 chooses C, it will be convenient for player 1 to choose A since it is the strategy that will generate the least loss (-10). On the other hand, if player 2 chooses option D, Player 1 will also choose option A since 200 is greater than 140 if he chooses B.

Thus, Player 1's dominant strategy is option A.

With respect to the dominant strategy of player 2 , if player 1 chooses A, it will be convenient for player 2 to choose C since it is the strategy that will generate the least loss (-10). Also, if player 1 chooses option B, player 2 will also choose option C since it will generate a higher payoff than option D(220,180).

Thus, Player 2's dominant strategy is option C.

02

Finding the secure strategy of each player

b.

The safe strategy of each player will be the one that will ensure the highest possible payoff in the worst possible scenario.

This strategy is used when there is no dominant strategy. Thus, the security strategy for player 1 will be option A while for player 2 it will be option C.

03

Finding the Nash equilibrium 

c.

Assuming that no player will win anything if he decides to change his strategy under the assumption that the other individuals do not change theirs, Player 1's most optimal strategy to Player 2's response will be option A, while Player's most optimal strategy 2 to Player l's response will be option C.

Therefore, the Nash equilibrium does exist in this game and it is strategy A, C (-10,-10).

It is important to mention that in this Nash equilibrium both players obtain losses, however in many cases the players would like to have an equilibrium with higher profits, only that there is a risk of being betrayed by the rival player.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Use the following one-shot, normal-form game to answer the questions below.

a. Find each playerโ€™s dominant strategy, if it exists.

b. Find each playerโ€™s secure strategy.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium.

While there is a degree of differentiation among general merchandise retailers like Target and Kmart, weekly newspaper circulars announcing sales provide evidence that these firms engage in price competition. This suggests that Target and Kmart simultaneously choose to announce one of two prices for a given product: a regular price or a sale price. Suppose that when one firm announces the sale price and the other announces the regular price for a particular product, the firm announcing the sale price attracts50million extra customers to earn a profit of \(7billion, compared to the \)4billion earned by the firm announcing the regular price. When both firms announce the sale price, the two firms split the market equally (each getting an extrarole="math" localid="1657018179629" 25million customers) to earn profits of \(2billion each. When both firms announce the regular price, each company attracts only its 50 million loyal customers and the firms each earn \)4billion in profits. If you were in charge of pricing at one of these firms, would you have a clear-cut pricing strategy? If so, explain why. If not, explain why not and propose a mechanism that might solve your dilemma. (Hint: Unlike Walmart, neither of these two firms guarantees โ€œEveryday low prices.โ€)

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions

a. What is player 1โ€™s optimal strategy? Why?

b. Determine player 1โ€™s equilibrium payoff.

Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1โ€™s actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives \(0 and player 2 receives \)25. If both players move left, player 1 receives \(5 and player 2 receives \)10. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives \(20 and player 2 receives \)20.

a. Write the above game in extensive form.

b. Find the Nash equilibrium outcomes to this game.

c. Which of the equilibrium outcomes is most reasonable? Explain

1.Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying question.

a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? Explain.

b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to โ€œcommunicateโ€ by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter, and what outcome do you think would occur as a result?

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2โ€™s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? Explain.

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