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Distinguish among dominant, secure, Nash, mixed, and subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, and identify such strategies in various games.

Short Answer

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a) Dominance strategy: A strategy for one player.

b) Secure: It ensures the maximum potential return in the worst-case situation.

c) Nash equilibrium: A strategy profile where a particular strategy is the best answer for each player.

d) Mixed strategy: It refers to a strategy in which players make a random choice among two or more possible actions based on a set of probabilities.

e) Sub-game perfect equilibrium:A sub-game is a portion of a bigger way that begins with a deciding node and includes anything that branches off to the right.

Step by step solution

01

Strategy

Setting objectives and priorities, defining steps to achieve the aims and objectives, as well as mobilizing resources to carry out the activities are all part of the strategy. A strategy specifies how the methods will be used to attain the ends (goals) (resources). An overall direction is established for the firm and its many parts to reach the desired future scenario.

02

Explanation for dominance, Secure, Nash, Mixed,and subgame perfect equilibrium strategies

a) Dominant Strategy:It is a strategy for a player, i.e., the optimum reaction to the other player's entire strategy profile. If all of the participants in a game use the same dominating strategy, the game is said to have dominant strategy equilibrium.

b) Secure: It ensures the maximum potential return in the worst-case situation.

c) Nash Equilibrium:Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile that is the optimal response for each player's specified strategy. Nash equilibrium, on the other hand, is a set of strategies in which each actor does their best given the other player's strategy. The theory behind Nash equilibrium is as follows: "I'm trying my best to give what you're doing, and you're doing your best to give what I'm doing."

d) Mixed strategy:It is a strategy in which players choose at random between two or more alternative actions based on a set of possibilities. It is distinct from pure strategy, in which players make particular decisions or perform specified actions.

e) Sub-game perfect equilibrium:A sub-game is a branch of an extended form that begins with a decision node and includes everything to the right of it. A valid sub-game begins at a decision node in a dataset unrelated to another. In theory, it means that the player who acts first in a suitable sub-game is aware of the actions taken by others leading up to that moment

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Most popular questions from this chapter

1.Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying question.

a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? Explain.

b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to โ€œcommunicateโ€ by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter, and what outcome do you think would occur as a result?

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2โ€™s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? Explain.

Use the following one-shot, normal-form game to answer the questions below.

a. Find each playerโ€™s dominant strategy, if it exists.

b. Find each playerโ€™s secure strategy.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium.

Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1โ€™s actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives \(0 and player 2 receives \)25. If both players move left, player 1 receives \(5 and player 2 receives \)10. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives \(20 and player 2 receives \)20.

a. Write the above game in extensive form.

b. Find the Nash equilibrium outcomes to this game.

c. Which of the equilibrium outcomes is most reasonable? Explain

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions

a. What is player 1โ€™s optimal strategy? Why?

b. Determine player 1โ€™s equilibrium payoff.

At a time when demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, "... for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. Suppose that when Kellogg's and its largest rival advertise, each company earns \(0 in profits. When neither company advertises, each company earns profits of \)12 billion. If one company advertises and the other does not, the company that advertises earns \(52 billion, and the company that does not advertise loses \)4 billion. Under what conditions could these firms use trigger strategies to support the collusive level of advertising?

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