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2. In a two-player, one-shot, simultaneous-move game, each player can choose strategy A or strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a payoff of \(400. If both players choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of \)200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns \(100 and player 2 earns \)600. If player 1 chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns \(600 and player 2 earns \)100.

a. Write the above game in normal form.

b. Find each player’s dominant strategy, if it exists.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.

d. Rank strategy pairs by aggregate payoff (highest to lowest).

e. Can the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff be sustained in equilibrium? Why or why not?

Short Answer

Expert verified

a. Possible combinations are-

P 2

A

B

P1

A

(400,400)

(100,600)

B

(600,100)

(200,200)

b. The dominant strategy of player 1 will be option B and dominant strategy of player 2 will be option B

c. The Nash equilibrium is the BB strategy (200,200).

d. We can rank each strategy from highest to lowest as follows:

AA(400,400)=$800AB(100,600)=$700BA(600,100)=$700BB(200,200)=$400

e.The outcome with the highest aggregate payoff AA will not be in equilibrium

Step by step solution

01

Finding possible combinations

  1. a.

In a scenario with two players in a one-shot, simultaneous-move game, the possible combinations of strategies A and B will be as follows.

P 2

A

B

P1

A

(400,400)

(100,600)

B

(600,100)

(200,200)

02

Finding the dominant strategy

b.

In order to establish the dominant strategy of player 1, we must take into account the decision made by player 2. It is important to keep in mind that the values of the first cell correspond to player 1 while the values of the second cell correspond to player two.

If player 2 selects option A, player 1 will chose option B since it generates a higher payoff (600) than option (400). Likewise, if player 2 chooses option B, player 1 will also choose option B since 200 is greater than 100 generated by option A. Therefore, the dominant strategy of player 1 will be option B, since regardless of the decision of player 2 the highest payoff will be obtained.

Regarding player 2's strategy, if player 1 selects option A, player 2 will select option B, since 600 is greater than 400 , while if player 1 selects B, player 2 will still choose option B. Therefore, the dominant strategy of player 2 will be option B, since regardless of the decision of player 1 the highest payoff will be obtained.

03

 Step 3: Finding the Nash equilibrium

c.

The Nash equilibrium occurs when the strategy that each player chooses and is the most optimal, that is, under another strategy, one of the players will not reach their maximum payoff.

As can be seen in table (a), the BB strategy (200,200) is the most optimal for both players. With any of the other combinations, some players will have a lower benefit.

04

 Step 4:To find rank strategy

  1. d.

We can rank each strategy from highest to lowest as follows:

AA(400,400)=$800AB(100,600)=$700BA(600,100)=$700BB(200,200)=$400

05

Finding equilibrium

In this one-shot-simultaneous game scenario the two players do not know the other player's decision and will only meet once and make a single decision regarding the price level of each one. Therefore a Nash equilibrium level scenario BB (200,200) benefits both players. However, this equilibrium represents the lowest outcome of the four scenarios. Likewise, the strategy that generates a greater outcome is AA, in which both players will have (400,400).

The dominant strategy of each is option B, which is completely independent and without knowledge of the decisions of another player, the equilibrium strategy will remain at BB. Thus, the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff AA will not be in equilibrium.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

1.Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying question.

a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? Explain.

b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter, and what outcome do you think would occur as a result?

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? Explain.

You are a pricing manager at Argyle Inc.—a medium-sized firm that recently introduced a new product into the market. Argyle’s only competitor is Baker Company, which is significantly smaller than Argyle. The management of Argyle has decided to pursue a short-term strategy of maximizing this quarter’s revenues, and you are in charge of formulating a strategy that will permit the firm to do so. After talking with an employee who was recently hired from the Baker Company, you are confident that

(a) Baker is constrained to charge for its product,

(b) Baker’s goal is to maximize this quarter’s profits, and

(c) Baker’s relevant unit costs are identical to yours. You have been authorized to price the product at two possible levels) and know that your relevant costs areper unit. The marketing department has provided the following information about the expected number of units sold (in millions) this quarter at various prices to help you formulate your decision:

Argyle and Baker currently set prices at the same time. However, Argyle can become the first-mover by spending \(2 million on computer equipment that would permit it to set its price before Baker. Determine Argyle’s optimal price and whether you should invest the \)2 million.

Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are the leading competitors in the market for cola products. In1960Coca-Cola introduced Sprite, which today is the worldwide leader in the lemon-lime soft drink market and ranks fourth among all soft drinks worldwide. Prior to1999, PepsiCo did not have a product that competed directly against Sprite and had to decide whether to introduce such a soft drink. By not introducing a lemon-lime soft drink, PepsiCo would continue to earn a200 \(million profits, and Coca-Cola would continue to earn a 300\)million profits. Suppose that by introducing a new lemon-lime soft drink, one of two possible strategies could be pursued: (1) PepsiCo could trigger a price war with Coca-Cola in both the lemon-lime and cola markets, or (2) Coca-Cola could acquiesce, and each firm maintains its current 50/50 split of the cola market and split the lemon-lime market30/70(PepsiCo/Coca-Cola). If PepsiCo introduced a lemon-lime soft drink and a price war resulted, both companies would earn profits of100 \(million. Alternatively, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo would earn \)275million and $227million, respectively, if PepsiCo introduced a lemon-lime soft drink and Coca-Cola acquiesced and split the markets as listed above. If you were a manager at PepsiCo, would you try to convince your colleagues that introducing the new soft drink is the most profitable strategy? Why or why not?

Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below.

a. For what values of x is strategy D (strictly) dominant for player 2?

b. For what values of x is strategy B (strictly) dominant for player 1?

c. For what values of x is (B, D) the only Nash equilibrium of the game?

Use the following one-shot, normal-form game to answer the questions below.

a. Find each player’s dominant strategy, if it exists.

b. Find each player’s secure strategy.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium.

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