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You manage a company that competes in an industry that is comprised of five equal-sized firms. A recent industry report indicates that a tariff on foreign imports would boost industry profits by \(30 million—and that it would only take \)5 million in expenditures on (legal) lobbying activities to induce Congress to implement such a tariff. Discuss your strategy for improving your company’s profits

Short Answer

Expert verified

The strategy to improve the company’s profit is to spend $1 million on lobbying activity to implement the tariff.

Step by step solution

01

The Game

Lobbying requires an expenditure of $5 million in total. So, each firm indulging in the activity would have to bear the share of the expenditure. If only my firm indulges in the activity, then it has to bear the whole cost, but if all the five firms take part as a whole, then each of them has to pay $1 million dollars each.

My Firm

Other Firm

Strategy

Lobby

Not Lobby

Lobby

$5, $5

$0, $6.25

Not lobby

$25, $0

$0, $0

02

Conclusion

Here, it can be seen that if my Firm doesn’t lobby then in both cases, it will receive $0 million profit. Hence, the company will indulge in lobbying activities. If other firms indulge in it as well then, my firm would receive only $5 million in profit and if they choose not to lobby then My firm will receive $25 million in profit.

Hence, it can be concluded that my company will choose the strategy to indulge in lobbying activities.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

At a time when demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, "... for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. Suppose that when Kellogg's and its largest rival advertise, each company earns \(0 in profits. When neither company advertises, each company earns profits of \)12 billion. If one company advertises and the other does not, the company that advertises earns \(52 billion, and the company that does not advertise loses \)4 billion. Under what conditions could these firms use trigger strategies to support the collusive level of advertising?

10.Using the same payoff matrix as in question 9, suppose this game is infinitely repeated and that the interest rate is sufficiently “low.” Identify trigger strategies that permit players 1 and 2 to earn equilibrium payoffs of 140 and 180, respectively, in each period.

Distinguish among dominant, secure, Nash, mixed, and subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, and identify such strategies in various games.

Apply normal form and extensive form representations of games to formulate decisions in strategic environments that include pricing, advertising, coordination, bargaining, innovation, product quality, monitoring employees, and entry.

Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below.

(a). Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium.

(b). Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.

(c). Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.

(d). Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is . If θis sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium?

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