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Apply normal form and extensive form representations of games to formulate decisions in strategic environments that include pricing, advertising, coordination, bargaining, innovation, product quality, monitoring employees, and entry.

Short Answer

Expert verified

Normal and Extensive forms of games formulate the strategic environments through Nash equilibrium, one-shot game and sequential bargaining.

Step by step solution

01

Definition of Normal Form Game

It is the representation of a game showing possible strategies and payoffs that resulted from alternative strategies to the players.

02

Formulation of strategic environments under Normal form game

Firm B

Firm A

Price

Sale price

Regular price

Sale price

$2, $2

$4, $7

Regular price

$7, $4

$4, $4

Here, the value in the cell represents the units of profits each firm gets on implementing sale price and regular price. If Firm B chooses sale price, then Firm A will always choose sale price as well which will lead Firm A and Firm B to receive $2 million each. On the other hand, if Firm B chooses regular price then Firm A will also choose regular price, as a result both will receive $4 million each. Hence, this game has two Nash equilibrium conditions.

Advertising and Quality Decisions

Kellogg

Rival

Strategy

Advertise

Don’t Advertise

Advertise

$0, $0

$-4, $52

Don’t Advertise

$52, $-4

$12, $12

Here, it can be seen that if Kellogg chooses to advertise and its rival reacting to such will choose to advertise as for rival the better pay-off is $0 than $-4. Hence, they will both receive $0. This condition is termed as prisoner’s dilemma when both the firms have no coordination. Thus, both the firms on trying to maximize their profits would choose to advertise, for both of the firms receiving $0 as their profits.

Coordination

Rival Kellogg

Strategy

Advertise

Don’t Advertise

Advertise

$0, $0

$-4, $52

Don’t Advertise

$52, $-4

$12, $12

Here, if both Kellogg and rival firm chooses to coordinate between themselves, they will decide not to advertise and both will receive $12 million as profits. Hence, coordination is profitable for both the firms.

03

Definition of Extensive Form Game

The game represents the game that summarizes the players, and the information that is available to them in every stage of the game including the strategies availability, sequential moves and payoffs.

04

Formulation of strategic environments under Extensive Form game

Here, through sequential bargaining, the rival decides their decision based on the decision made by the leader firm. If Kellogg chooses to be hard on the rival firm and chooses to advertise, then the rival will choose to advertise as not receiving anything is better than losing $4 million. Hence, both firms will receive $0 million dollars each. Thus, Kellogg will choose not to advertise. If both the firms coordinate then, both will receive $12 million profit each.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions

a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy? Why?

b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff.

7. Use the following extensive-form game to answer the questions below.

a. List the feasible strategies for player 1 and player 2.

b. Identify the Nash equilibria to this game.

c. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.

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