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At a time when demand for ready-to-eat cereal was stagnant, a spokesperson for the cereal maker Kellogg's was quoted as saying, "... for the past several years, our individual company growth has come out of the other fellow's hide." Kellogg's has been producing cereal since 1906 and continues to implement strategies that make it a leader in the cereal industry. Suppose that when Kellogg's and its largest rival advertise, each company earns \(0 in profits. When neither company advertises, each company earns profits of \)12 billion. If one company advertises and the other does not, the company that advertises earns \(52 billion, and the company that does not advertise loses \)4 billion. Under what conditions could these firms use trigger strategies to support the collusive level of advertising?

Short Answer

Expert verified

Trigger Strategiesi30percent

Step by step solution

01

Collusive oligopoly

A conspiracy Oligopoly is a market condition in which oligopolists prefer to collaborate rather than compete with one another. They try not to compete in the market, productivity, or another criterion.

02

Explanation

Given,

In the present period, the cheating company's profit is $52

The profit of each colluding business is $12

The clearing company's profit in the next term is $0

The rate of interest at which these companies may utilise trigger methods to promote collusive advertising can be calculated using the formula:

ΠCheatΠco-opΠco-opΠNash1i521212=01ii1240i0.3

i30percent

Hence, the interest rate should be equal to or exceed 40%.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose a UAW labour contract with General Dynamics is being renegotiated. Some of the many issues on the table include job security, health benefits, and wages. If you are an executive in charge of human resource issues at General Dynamics, would you be better off (a) Letting the union bear the expense of crafting a document summarizing its desired compensation or (b) Making the union a take-it-or-leave-it offer? Explain.

2. In a two-player, one-shot, simultaneous-move game, each player can choose strategy A or strategy B. If both players choose strategy A, each earns a payoff of \(400. If both players choose strategy B, each earns a payoff of \)200. If player 1 chooses strategy A and player 2 chooses strategy B, then player 1 earns \(100 and player 2 earns \)600. If player 1 chooses strategy B and player 2 chooses strategy A, then player 1 earns \(600 and player 2 earns \)100.

a. Write the above game in normal form.

b. Find each player’s dominant strategy, if it exists.

c. Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game.

d. Rank strategy pairs by aggregate payoff (highest to lowest).

e. Can the outcome with the highest aggregate payoff be sustained in equilibrium? Why or why not?

9. Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions.

Suppose this is a one-shot game:

a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not.

b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not.

c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not

Japanese officials are considering a new tariff on imported pork products from the United States in an attempt to reduce Japan’s reliance on U.S. pork. Due to political pressure, the U. S. International Trade Representative’s (ITR) office is also considering a new tariff on imported steel from Japan. Officials in both Japan and the United States must assess the social welfare ramifications of their tariff decisions. Reports from a reliable think tank indicate the following: If neither country imposes a new tariff, social welfare in Japan’s economy will remain at \(10billion and social welfare in the United States will remain at \)50billion. If both countries impose a new tariff, welfare in the United States declines \( 49.1 billion and welfare in Japan declines by \) 8.9billion. If Japan does not impose a tariff but the United States does, projected welfare in Japan is \(billion while welfare in the United States is \)52.5billion. Finally, if the United States does not impose a tariff but Japan does, welfare is projected at \(48.2billion in the United States and \) 11.4billion in Japan. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcome when policy makers in the two countries simultaneously but independently make tariff decisions in a myopic (one-shot) setting. Is it possible for the two countries to improve their social welfare by “agreeing” to different strategies? Explain.

1.Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying question.

a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? Explain.

b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter, and what outcome do you think would occur as a result?

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? Explain.

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