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10.Using the same payoff matrix as in question 9, suppose this game is infinitely repeated and that the interest rate is sufficiently “low.” Identify trigger strategies that permit players 1 and 2 to earn equilibrium payoffs of 140 and 180, respectively, in each period.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The trigger strategy of the Player 1 will be choosing option A.

The trigger strategy of Player 2 will be to choose option C .

Step by step solution

01

What is trigger strategy?

The trigger strategy is a strategy that a player will adopt if the rival player decides to violate the agreement and not cooperate and seek to achieve a greater benefit at the expense of the other player's decision made in the agreement.

Using the same payoff matrix of the exercise (9) we now assume that each player's decisions will be repeated indefinitely and repeatedly in which both players collude and reach an agreement to choose the most optimal balance option, which in this case would be strategy B, D (140,180).

02

Finding trigger strategy of player 1 

Player 2 decides to cheat and choose option C (knowing that Player 1 will choose B) he will obtain a greater benefit (from 180 to 220).In the successive periods the trigger strategy of the Player 1 will be choosing option A and where both players will obtain - 10 .

03

 Finding trigger strategy of player 2

If Player 1 decides to cheat and choose option A (where it is known that Player 2 will choose D) he will get a greater benefit (from 140 to 200). The trigger strategy of Player 2 will be to choose option C. In the following periods both players will obtain -10.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below.

(a). Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium.

(b). Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.

(c). Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? Explain.

(d). Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is . If θis sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium?

Japanese officials are considering a new tariff on imported pork products from the United States in an attempt to reduce Japan’s reliance on U.S. pork. Due to political pressure, the U. S. International Trade Representative’s (ITR) office is also considering a new tariff on imported steel from Japan. Officials in both Japan and the United States must assess the social welfare ramifications of their tariff decisions. Reports from a reliable think tank indicate the following: If neither country imposes a new tariff, social welfare in Japan’s economy will remain at \(10billion and social welfare in the United States will remain at \)50billion. If both countries impose a new tariff, welfare in the United States declines \( 49.1 billion and welfare in Japan declines by \) 8.9billion. If Japan does not impose a tariff but the United States does, projected welfare in Japan is \(billion while welfare in the United States is \)52.5billion. Finally, if the United States does not impose a tariff but Japan does, welfare is projected at \(48.2billion in the United States and \) 11.4billion in Japan. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcome when policy makers in the two countries simultaneously but independently make tariff decisions in a myopic (one-shot) setting. Is it possible for the two countries to improve their social welfare by “agreeing” to different strategies? Explain.

Suppose Toyota and Honda must decide whether to make a new breed of side-impact airbags standard equipment on all models. Side-impact airbags raise the price of each automobile by \(1000. If both firms make side-impact airbags standard equipment, each company will earn profits of \)2.5billion. If neither company adopts the side-impact airbag technology, each company will earn1billion (due to lost sales to other automakers). If one company adopts the technology as standard equipment and the other does not, the adopting company will earn a profit of \(role="math" localid="1657018879671" 3billion and the other company will lose \)1.5billion. If you were a decision maker at Honda, would you make side-impact airbags standard equipment? Explain.

Use the following payoff matrix for a simultaneous-move one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions

a. What is player 1’s optimal strategy? Why?

b. Determine player 1’s equilibrium payoff.

1.Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying question.

a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? Explain.

b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter, and what outcome do you think would occur as a result?

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? Explain.

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