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The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly isP2003(Q1+Q2)andcostsareC1(Q1)26Q1andC2(Q2)32Q2.

a. Determine the reaction function for each firm.

b. Calculate each Firm’s equilibrium output.

c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.

d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.

Short Answer

Expert verified

a. Reaction function of firm 1 is2912Q2,and firm 2 is2812Q1

b.Equilibrium output of firm 1 is 20, and firm 2 is 18.

c.Equilibrium market price isP=86

d.The profit firm 1 earns in equilibrium is$1200,and firm 2 is$972

Step by step solution

01

Model of imperfect competition 

The Courante oligopoly is a model of imperfect competition in which two firms have the same cost functions and compete with homogeneous goods in a static environment. The duopoly has the following functions:

Inverse demand function:P=2003(Q1+Q2)

Cost function firm 1:C1Q1=26Q1

Cost function firm 2:C2Q2=32Q2

02

(a) To obtain the reaction functions 

To obtain the reaction functions in the Courante oligopoly, it is important to consider that changes in the marginal income will impact firm 1 will have an impact on the marginal income of firm 2; therefore, if firm 2 increases its production, firm 1 will have lower income.

Therefore, by equating the marginal revenues (MR) firmly with the marginal costs (MC) of firm 1 and we solve forQ1as a function ofQ2, we will obtain the reaction function of firm 1 and vice versa.

Therefore, the following condition must be met:

MRQ1=MCQ1andMRQ2=MCQ2

03

Fulfilling the condition

Fulfilling the condition that

TotalIncome=Price×QuantityWe multiply the inverse demand function byQ1,and then we derive it from obtaining the marginal income for firm 1:

TotalRevenue=Price×Quantity

TotalRevenue=2003Q123Q1Q2

MR=PQ1dQ1=200Q13Q123Q1Q2MR=PQ1dQ1=2006Q13Q2

And deriving from the marginal cost of the firm1:

MC=CQ1dQ1=26

04

Equating marginal revenue and marginal cost 

Equating marginal revenue and marginal cost and solving for,Q1we will obtain the reaction function of firm 1:

2006Q13Q2=262006Q13Q2=26Q1=200263Q26Q1=2912Q2

05

Equating the income and marginal costs

By obtaining the income and marginal costs and equating them, we can obtain the reaction function for firm 2:

MR=PQ2dQ2=200Q23Q1Q23Q22MR=PQ2dQ2=2003Q16Q2

And deriving from the marginal cost of the firm:

MC=CQ2dQ2=32

06

Equating marginal revenues and costs

Equating marginal revenues and costs and solving forQ2to obtain the reaction function of firm 2:

2003Q16Q2=326Q2=200323Q1Q2=200323Q16Q2=2812Q1

Therefore, the reaction function of firm 1 is 2912Q2and firm 22812Q1

07

(b) To obtain the equilibrium output

To obtain the equilibrium output of each firm, we can substitute the reaction equation of firm 2 in firm 1 and solve forQ1:

Q1=2912(2812Q1)Q1=2914+1/4Q1Q11/4Q1=15Q11/4Q1=1/4Q1+151/4Q13/4Q1=15

Multiplying both sides by 4

4×3/4Q1=15×43Q1=60Q1=20

08

Substituting the value 

Substituting the value obtained inQ1we can substitute it in the reaction function of firm to obtain the equilibrium output of firm 2 :

Q2=2812(20)Q2=2810Q2=18

Therefore, output by the equilibrium of firm1 is20,and Firm2 is.18

09

(c) To obtain the equilibrium market price

To obtain the equilibrium market price, we can substitute the equilibrium values of the firm’s outpu1and2(Q1andQ2)tin the inverse demand function of the duopoly.

P=2003(Q1+Q2)P=2003(20+18)P=200114P=86

Therefore, the market price of equilibrium isP=86

10

(d) Obtain the benefits 

The benefits of the duopoly under the Cournot scheme, as in any market, the following relationship is fulfilled:

Benefit(II)=TotalRevenueTotalCost

For Firm 1 we can obtain the following benefit:

Benefit(Π)=P×Q126Q1Benefit(Π)=(86×20)26(20)Benefit(Π)=$1,200

For the firm, we can obtain the following benefit:

Benefit(Π)=P×Q232Q2Benefit(Π)=(86×18)32(18)Benefit(Π)=$972

Therefore, profit earned in equilibrium by firm 1 is $1,200, and firm 2 is$972

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Most popular questions from this chapter

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