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Jones is the manager of an upscale clothing store in a shopping mall that contains only two such stores. While these two competitors do not carry the same brands of clothes, they serve a similar clientele. Jones was recently notified that the mall is going to implement a 10 percent across-the-board increase in rents to all stores in the mall, effective next month. Should Jones raise her prices 10 percent to offset the increase in monthly rent? Explain carefully.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The manager should not increase the prices in his two stores.

Step by step solution

01

Introduction 

It is important to bear in mind that the manager of both stores in the shopping mall, despite having differentiated products, has the same clientele. Therefore, any increase in prices can reduce profits and increase the market share of the rival store.

02

To explain Jones should raise her prices 10 percent  

Faced with an upcoming 10%rent increase in all stores implemented in all stores, the manager is faced with the decision to increase their prices by10% to offset this increase.

In the short term, this decision does not seem very beneficial, since if the price of the two store increases, the other rival stores will not follow it in this decision and will maintain a lower price to obtain a greater market share when the rent increase is established in the shopping mall.

On the other hand, this increase in rent corresponds to a fixed cost, which would not have an impact on the marginal costs of the two stores and therefore on prices.

Thus, the manager should not increase the prices in his two stores.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

You are the manager of Taurus Technologies, and your sole competitor is Spyder Technologies. The two firmsโ€™ products are viewed as identical by most consumers. The relevant cost functions are C(Qi )= Qi , and the inverse market demand curve for this unique product is given byP=160โˆ’2Q. Currently, you and your rival simultaneously (but independently) make production decisions, and the price you fetch for the product depends on the total amount produced by each firm. However, by making an unrecoverable fixed investment of \(200 , Taurus Technologies can bring its product to market before Spyder finalizes production plans. Should you invest the \) 200? Explain

The following diagram illustrates the reaction functions and isoprofit curves for a homogeneous-product duopoly in which each firm produces at constant marginal cost.

a. If your rival produces50units of output, what is your optimal level of output?

b. In equilibrium, how much will each firm produce in a Cournet oligopoly?

c. In equilibrium, what is the output of the leader and follower in a Stackelberg oligopoly?

d. How much output would be produced if the market were monopolized?

e. Suppose you and your rival agree to a collusive arrangement in which each firm produces half of the monopoly output.

(1) What is your output under the collusive arrangement?

(2) What is your optimal output if you believe your rival will live up to the agreement?

Consider a homogeneous-product duopoly where each firm initially produces at a constant marginal cost of \(and there are no fixed costs. Determine what would happen to each firmโ€™s equilibrium output and profits if firmโ€™s marginal cost increased to \)but firmโ€™s marginal cost remained constant at $in each of the following settings:

a. Cournot duopoly.

b. Sweezy oligopoly.

Every end-of-chapter problem addresses at least one learning objective. Following is a non exhaustive sample of end-of-chapter problems for each learning objective.

LO1 Explain how beliefs and strategic interaction shape optimal decisions in oligopoly environments.

Provide a real-world example of a market that approximates each oligopoly setting, and explain your reasoning.

a. Cournot oligopoly.

b. Stackelberg oligopoly.

c. Bertrand oligopoly

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